Introduction to Usable Privacy


Privacy Seminar 2025 20 February 2025 Christine Utz



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AGENDA

- What is usable privacy?
- The human factor in privacy (& security)
- Challenges for usable privacy
- Usable privacy research
- Current trends

WHAT IS USABLE PRIVACY?

Usability:

- Roughly: the ability of a system to allow its users to perform their tasks safely, effectively, and efficiently while enjoying the experience
- Focus on the human factor
- Multitude of definitions and frameworks

Privacy:

- Multitude of definitions
- See slides from Lecture 1

USERS ARE NOT MACHINES

End users:

- Top priority: functionality & convenience
- Security & privacy only secondary goals
- May be tired, stressed, or otherwise unattentive
- •

Developers:

- Top priorities: functionality & efficiency
- Security & privacy only secondary goals
- Typically operate under high pressure and resource constraints
- •

Work with human users and their flaws to design systems that are still private and secure.

WORK WITH, NOT AGAINST USERS

Users Are Not

Why users compromise computer security mechanisms and how to take remedial measures.

Confidentiality is an important aspect of computer security. It

depends on authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, to safeguard access to information [9]. Traditionally, authentication procedures are divided into two stages: identification (User ID), to identify the user; and authentication, to verify that the user is the legitimate owner of the ID. It is the latter stage that requires a secret password. To date, research on password security has focused on designing technical mechanisms to protect

assumed to be. Since security mechanisms are password has been chosen to its level of security. designed, implemented, ___

applied and breached by ANNE ADAMS AND people, human factors should be considered in MARTINA ANGELA SASSE composed of letters their design. It seems that -

currently, hackers pay more attention to the lifetime-changing passwords frequently-is sugneering techniques to obtain passwords.

The key element in password security is the recommended to: crackability of a password combination. Davies and Ganesan [3] argue that an adversary's ability • Increase individual accountability; to crack passwords is greater than usually believed. • Reduce illicit usage; System-generated passwords are essentially the • Allow for an establishment of system usage optimal security approach; however, user-generated passwords are potentially more memorable • Reduce frequent password changes due to and thus less likely to be disclosed (because users

access to systems; the usability of these mecha- do not have to write them down). The U.S. Fednisms has rarely been investigated. Hitchings [8] eral Information Processing Standards [5] suggest and Davis and Price [4] argue that this narrow per-several criteria for assuring different levels of passspective has produced security mechanisms that word security. Password composition, for example, are, in practice, less effective than they are generally relates the size of a character set from which a

human link in the security chain than security gested as reducing the risk associated with undedesigners do, for example, by using social engi- tected compromised passwords. Finally, password ownership, in particular individual ownership, is

- audit trails: and
- group membership fluctuations.

COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM December 1999/Vol. 42, No. 12 4 1

THE SECURITY-USABILITY TRADEOFF MYTH **Developers Are Not the Enemy!** The Need for Usable Security APIs Matthew Green | Johns Hopkins University Matthew Smith | University of Bonn and Fraunhofer FKIE Modern security practice has created an adversarial relationship between security software designers and developers. But developers aren't the enemy. To strenethen security systems across the board, security professionals must focus on creating developer-friendly and developer-centric approaches. T security mechanisms are failing to keep pace with The Developers' Role In Usable Security

the threats they face, increasingly exposing our sys- and Privacy tems and critical infrastructures to attacks. These failures The usable security and privacy field studies end

sively on the problem's technical side, viewing the produced recommendations on how administrators human user as "the weakest link in the chain." However, should set policies that enable users to create strong yet the relatively new research domain of usable security memorable passwords. adapt to its users rather than require users to adapt to questions to be answered by studying end users. Howtechnology. Three seminal papers-Mary Ellen Zurko ever, despite the earliest work in this domain calland Richard Simon's "User-Centered Security," Anne ing for support for all involved actors-particularly Adams and M. Angela Sasse's "Users Are Not the developers2-current research almost entirely dis-Enemy,"3 and Alma Whitten and J.D. Tygar's "Why counts the fact that administrators and software devel-5.0*4—originated this school of thought. All argued more, than end users (Ivan Flechais and his colleagues' to be dealt with; rather, they must communicate more users normally only endanger themselves, if adminis-

are wide ranging and affect home users, enterprises, and user behavior, perceptions, problems, and wishes. Its governments alike. A 2014 study conducted by McAfee, researchers inform system administrators and soft-Intel, and the Center for Strategic and International ware developers of the results and make concrete sug-Studies estimates cybercrime's global cost to be US\$400 gestions as to how developers and administrators can billion per year. The reasons for these failures can be clasmake their software and services more functional for sified broadly as either technical failures or human error. end users. A classic example of usable security research For a long time, security research focused exclu- is the study of users' password behavior, which has

and privacy takes a different stance: technology should
There are many interesting, worthwhile research Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP opers also make mistakes and need help as much, if not that security experts shouldn't see users as problems work is one notable exception. 5) Critically, whereas end with users and adopt user-centered design approaches. trators or developers make mistakes, they endanger all

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- Adams & Sasse, Communications of the ACM 42 (12), 1999, pp. 41–46, https://doi.org/10.1145/322796.322806
- Green & Smith, IEEE Security & Privacy 14 (5), 2016, pp. 40–46, https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2016.111

USABILITY PRINCIPLES

ISO Dialogue Principles (ISO 9241-110)

- Suitability for the user's tasks
- Self-descriptiveness
- Conformity with user expectations
- Learnability
- Controllability
- Robustness against user error
- User engagement

USABILITY PRINCIPLES



USABLE SECURITY & PRIVACY

Security vs. HCl vs. Usable Security

Security	Usability/HCI	Usable Security
What is the space of	How difficult is it for a	All the security/privacy
possible passwords?	user to create,	and usability HCI
	remember, and enter a	questions
How can we make the	password? How long	
password space larger to	does it take?	How do users select
make the password		passwords? How can we
harder to guess?	How hard is it for users to	help them choose
	learn the system?	passwords harder for
How are the stored		attackers to predict?
passwords secured?	Are users <i>motivated</i> to	
	put in effort to create	As the password space
Can an attacker gain	good passwords?	increases, what are the
knowledge by observing a		impacts on usability
user entering her	Is the system accessible	factors and predictability
password?	for users of all abilities?	of human selection?

TYPICAL QUESTIONS


- How do non-technical people think about systems and associated privacy risks (mental models)?
- What data are users willing to disclose in which contexts?
- What could be done to increase this awareness?
- Do privacy perceptions differ between different demographics?
- Do users understand privacy disclosures?
- How do users perceive and interact with privacy controls?
- Are privacy options transparently shown or hidden on purpose?
- What strategies do users employ to protect their privacy online?
- Which tradeoffs are users willing to accept to protect their privacy?



WHAT ARE CHALLENGES TO MAKE PRIVACY USABLE?

- Lack of awareness and knowledge
- "Notice & Consent" overwhelming users with prompts and legalese
- Dark patterns and deceptive design
- Economics: business models
- Privacy usability tradeoffs
- Interdependent privacy
- ...

CHALLENGE: LACK OF KNOWLEDGE & AWARENESS



Aaron Sankin and Surya Mattu, The High Privacy Cost of a "Free" Website, https://themarkup.org/blacklight/2020/09/22/blacklight-tracking-advertisers-digital-privacy-sensitive-websites

NUDGES TO INCREASE AWARENESS

Managing Personal Privacy

CHI 2015, Crossings, Seoul, Korea

Your Location has been Shared 5,398 Times! A Field Study on Mobile App Privacy Nudging

Hazim Almuhimedi,¹ Florian Schaub,¹ Norman Sadeh,¹ Idris Adjerid,² Alessandro Acquisti,¹ Joshua Gluck,¹ Lorrie Cranor,¹ Yuvraj Agarwal¹


¹Carnegie Mellon University {hazim,fschaub,sadeh,acquisti,jgluck, lorrie,yuvraj.agarwal}@cmu.edu ²University of Notre Dame iadjerid@nd.edu

ABSTRACT

Smartphone users are often unaware of the data collected by apps running on their devices. We report on a study that evaluates the benefits of giving users an app permission manager and sending them nudges intended to raise their awareness of the data collected by their apps. Our study provides both qualitative and quantitative biases, and decision heuristics that often lead to privacy-adverse decisions in favor of short-term benefits [3]. Privacy nudges have been proposed to support users in their privacy decision making [2]. Such nudges aim to make privacy risks more salient and help users move towards privacy settings that better align with their privacy expectations and concerns. One of the goals of




AWARENESS CAMPAIGNS



CHALLENGE: "NOTICE AND CONSENT" APPROACH

"Notice and Consent"





I ACCEPT

Show purposes

consent choices at any time by returning to this site.

PRIVACY POLICIES: LAW...

Section 2

Information and access to personal data

Article 13

Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data subject

- 1. Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information:
- (a) the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller's representative;
- (b) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;
- (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing;
- (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;
- (e) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;
- (f) where applicable, the fact that the controller intends to transfer personal data to a third country or international organisation and the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or in the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy of them or where they have been made available.
- 2. In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with the following further information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing:
- (a) the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period;
- (b) the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject or to object to processing as well as the right to data portability:
- (c) where the processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw consent at any time, without affecting the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal;
- (d) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority;
- (e) whether the provision of personal data is a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement necessary to enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to provide the personal data and of the possible consequences of failure to provide such data;
- (f) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.
- 3. Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for a purpose other than that for which the personal data were collected, the controller shall provide the data subject prior to that further processing with information on that other purpose and with any relevant further information as referred to in paragraph 2.
- 4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not apply where and insofar as the data subject already has the information.


Article 14

Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject

- 1. Where personal data have not been obtained from the data subject, the controller shall provide the data subject with the following information:
- (a) the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller's representative;
- (b) the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;
- (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing;
- (d) the categories of personal data concerned;
- (e) the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data, if any;
- (f) where applicable, that the controller intends to transfer personal data to a recipient in a third country or international organisation and the existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the Commission, or in the case of transfers referred to in Article 46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable safeguards and the means to obtain a copy of them or where they have been made available.
- 2. In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller shall provide the data subject with the following information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing in respect of the data subject:
- (a) the period for which the personal data will be stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that
- (b) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party;
- (c) the existence of the right to request from the controller access to and rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing concerning the data subject and to object to processing as well as the right to data portability:
- (d) where processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right to withdraw consent at any time, without affecting the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal:
- (e) the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority;
- (f) from which source the personal data originate, and if applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible sources;
- (g) the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.
- 3. The controller shall provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2:
- (a) within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the personal data are processed;
- (b) if the personal data are to be used for communication with the data subject, at the latest at the time of the first communication to that data subject; or
- (c) if a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, at the latest when the personal data are first disclosed.
- 4. Where the controller intends to further process the personal data for a purpose other than that for which the personal data were obtained, the controller shall provide the data subject prior to that further processing with information on that other purpose and with any relevant further information as referred to in paragraph 2.

... VS. REALITY





Art project by Dima Yarovinsky, https://www.designboom.com/readers/dima-yarovinsky-visualizes-facebook-instagram-snapchatterms-of-service-05-07-2018/

CONSENT NOTICES: LAW ...

Article 5(3) ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) (as of Directive 2009/136/EC)

- 5) Article 5(3) shall be replaced by the following:
 - 3. Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned has given his or her consent, having been provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service.';

governs the placement of information in users' browsers

Article 6(1)(a) GDPR

Article 6

Lawfulness of processing

- Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies:
- (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes;
- (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
- (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;
- (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;
- (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;
- (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.

governs the processing of personal data



... VS. REALITY




Marktplaats.nl gebruikt functionele, analytische en tracking cookies (en daarmee vergelijkbare technieken) om jouw ervaring op onze website te verbeteren en om je van relevante advertenties te voorzien.

Ook derde partijen kunnen cookies en vergelijkbare technieken plaatsen om jouw internetgedrag te volgen en je gepersonaliseerde advertenties te tonen binnen en/of buiten onze website.

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
Information storage and access

What this means: The storage of information, or access to information that is already stored, on your device such as advertising identifiers, device identifiers, cookies, and similar technologies.

Depending on the type of data they collect, use, and process and other factors including privacy by design, certain partners rely on your consent while others require you to opt-out. For information on each vendor and to exercise your choices, see below. Or to opt-out, visit the NAI, DAA, or EDAA sites.

Allow All

AdClear GmbH ☑	requires opt-out
ADARA MEDIA UNLIMITED ☑	Allow
ad6media ☑	Allow
Acuityads Inc. ☑	Allow
Active Agent AG ☑	requires opt-out
Accorp Sp. z o.o. [2]	requires opt-out
A.Mob ☑	Allow
A Million Ads Limited ☑	requires opt-out
7Hops.com Inc. (ZergNet) ☑	requires opt-out
33Across ☑	Allow
2KDirect, Inc. (dba iPromote) ☑	requires opt-out
1plusX AG ☑	requires opt-out
1020, Inc. dba Placecast and Ericsson Emodo ☐	Allow
1000mercis [☑	Allow
Allow All	



Evästeiden avulla parempia palveluja

Evästeiden avulla kerätyn tiedon ansiosta voimme tarjota sinulle parempia palveluja: käyttökokemus, sivustojen toiminta, sisältösuositukset ja mainonnan osuvuus paranevat. Evästeitä käytetään myös käviiämittaukseen.

Klikkaamalla ok hyväksyt, että Sanoma ja yhteistyökumppanit keräävät evästetietoa ja käyttävät sitä mainonnan ja markkinoinnin kohdentamiseen.

Lue lisää evästeistä ja hallinnoi omia asetuksiasi täällä.

sanoma

Cookies help us improve our web content and deliver a personalized experience. By using this website, you agree to our use of cookies.

Type `man cookies` to learn more or `exit` to close.

~ root#



PRIVACY "NUTRITION LABELS"

App Privacy See Details

The developer, TikTok Ltd., indicated that the app's privacy practices may include handling of data as described below. For more information, see the developer's privacy policy.




Data Used to Track You

The following data may be used to track you across apps and websites owned by other companies:



Identifiers






Data Not Linked to You

The following data may be collected but it is not linked to your identity:

Usage Data



Contacts

Contacts

Data safety


Here's more information the developer has provided about the kinds of data this app may collect

O Location Approximate location App activity App interactions, In-app search history, Other user-generated content, and Other actions Photos and videos Photos and Videos Financial info User payment info, Purchase history, and Other financial info Personal info Name, Email address, User IDs, Address, Phone number, and Other info ব) Audio Voice or sound recordings Web browsing Web browsing history Data collected and for what purpose ① Web browsing history · Optional Advertising or marketing lacktriangleSecurity practices Data is encrypted in transit Your data is transferred over a secure connection You can request that data be deleted The developer provides a way for you to request that your data be deleted Independent security review This app has been independently validated against a global security standard. See details For more information about collected and shared data, see the developer's privacy policy

App Privacy Labels (Apple App Store)

Data Safety Labels (Google Play Store)

CONTEXTUALIZING PRIVACY INFORMATION



The profile detailed how Carlson ridiculed his first-grade teacher in a book - and reported her shock on finding out.

Comments on Bailey's Instagram post were mostly appreciative, including clapping hand and beer emojis and sentiments including "American hero!!" and "Thank you!!"

His earlier posts included photos of a dog, hunting, fishing and other outdoor activities.

Allow Instagram content?

This article includes content provided by Instagram. We ask for your permission before anything is loaded, as they may be using cookies and other technologies. To view this content, **click 'Allow and continue'**.



In a statement, Fox News <u>said</u>: "Ambushing Tucker Carlson while he is in a store with his family is totally inexcusable - no public figure should be accosted regardless of their political persuasion or beliefs simply due to the intolerance of another point of view."

Contextual privacy policy (Pan et al., SeePrivacy)

Contextual consent button (The Guardian)

BROWSER-BASED PRIVACY CONTROLS


- Do Not Track (DNT) failed due to lack of adoption
- Global Privacy Control (GPC) to send "Do Not Sell" requests under the CCPA, legally binding in California
- Advanced Data Protection Control (ADPC): designed for GDPR








PRIVACY BY DESIGN



"Notice and Consent"



Privacy by Design



Article 25 GDPR Data protection by design and by default

"2. The controller shall [...] ensur[e] that, by default, **only personal data which are necessary** for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That [...] applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility."



CHALLENGE: DARK (OR DECEPTIVE) PATTERNS

= a user interface that has been carefully crafted to trick users into doing things [they would otherwise not have done] (Brighnull 2011)

More info & "hall of shame": https://www.deceptive.design


Examples:

- Bad defaults
- Visual interference
- Nagging
- Forced action
- Overly complex click paths ("privacy maze", "privacy Zuckering")
- Fake scarcity
- Confirmshaming
- •
- Harry Brighnull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design, 2011, https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs.-honesty-in-ui-design/
- Colin Gray et al., An Ontology of Dark Patterns Knowledge: Foundations, Definitions, and a Pathway for Shared Knowledge-Building, CHI 2024, Article No. 289, https://doi.org/10.1145/3613904.3642436 (preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.09640)

EXAMPLE: CONSENT NOTICES


Consent: "freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous"








EXAMPLE: YOUTUBE




Default YouTube embed code: cookie set as soon as the website embedding the video is visited



dark pattern: option


"Privacy-enhanced mode": cookie only set upon interaction with the embedded video

ACTIVITY: DARK PATTERNS IN GOOGLE ANALYTICS







CHALLENGE: CONFLICTING BUSINESS INTERESTS



BUSINESS MODELS FOR PRIVACY














Contextual ads


Each campaign is matched to the target audience on hand-approved publishers with a combination of **contextual and geographic targeting**.



CHALLENGE: PRIVACY – USABILITY TRADEOFFS




WhatsApp: automated phone book upload & contact discovery



Element / Matrix: manual entry of user name and password



CHALLENGE: INTERDEPENDENT PRIVACY



WhatsApp: automated phone book upload & contact discovery

People's privacy decisions can influence others:

- Bystander privacy
- Uploading others' picture to social media
- Syncing others' personal data into cloud backups
- WhatsApp phone upload to sync contacts
- ...



USABLE PRIVACY RESEARCH

Awareness, Adoption, and Misconceptions of Web Privacy Tools

A Design Space for Effective Privacy Notices

Defending Against the Dark Arts: Recognising Dark Patterns in Social Media

A Comprehensive Quality Evaluation of Security and Privacy Advice on the Web

"My Data Just Goes Everywhere:"
User Mental Models of the Internet and Implications for Privacy and Security

Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy:
A Field Experiment

"Privacy is not for me, it's for those rich women": Performative Privacy Practices on Mobile Phones by Women in South Asia


Publication venues:

- Proceedings on Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs / PETS)
- Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS)
- ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI)
- Security & Privacy conferences (USENIX Security, NDSS, ACM CCS, IEEE S&P, ...)
- Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES)
- •

HCI METHODS

Methods from Human-Computer Interaction (HCI)

- Quantitative: numerical data, analysis with mathematical / computational techniques
 Examples: measurements of user interactions, Likert scales and other closed-ended questions in surveys)
- Qualitative: non-numerical data that cannot be (meaningfully) quantified, analysis involves identification of recurring patters and themes, categorization, etc. Examples: surveys (e.g., open-ended questions), interviews, focus groups, interface analysis, content analysis, ...
- Mixed-method approaches



Likert scale (Source: Wikipedia)



EXAMPLE: USER INTERACTIONS WITH CONSENT NOTICES

Session 4E: Privacy III

CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom

(Un)informed Consent: Studying GDPR Consent Notices in the Field

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ABSTRACT

Since the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 more than 60 % of popular websites in Europe display cookie consent notices to their visitors. This has quickly led to users becoming fatigued with privacy notifications and contributed to the rise of both browser extensions that block these banners and demands for a solution that bundles consent across multiple websites or in the browser. In this work, we identify common properties of the graphical user interface of consent notices and conduct three experiments with more than 80,000 unique users on a German website to investigate the influence of notice position, type of choice, and content framing on consent. We find that users are more likely to interact with a notice shown in the lower (left) part of the screen.

ACM Reference Format:


Christine Utz, Martin Degeling, Sascha Fahl, Florian Schaub, and Thorsten Holz. 2019. (Un)informed Consent: Studying GDPR Consent Notices in the Field. In 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '19), November 11–15, 2019, London, United Kingdom. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 18 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3354212

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, we have seen worldwide efforts to create or update privacy laws that address the challenges posed by pervasive computing and the "data economy". Examples include the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [46], which went into effect on May 25, 2018, and the California Consumer Pri-




STUDY SETUP



User visits website

User is shown 1 of n consent notices.
Plugin measures all interactions with notice

quantitative




Notice is replaced with invitation to survey

specific survey
quantitative
qualitative


Behavior- / notice-



EXPERIMENTS







Experiment 1: Position

Highest interaction: bottom left

Experiment 2: Choices / nudging

Significant influence of options & nudging

Experiment 3:
Privacy policy link /
(non-)technical
language
Little influence on

interaction rates

COMMON PITFALLS


- Realism (in-lab vs. field study)
- Ecological validity
- Recruitment, participant sample, selection bias
- Self-reported answers, social desirability bias, privacy paradox
- Other biases: agreement bias, order bias, ...
- Possible need for deception about study purpose
- Research ethics
- ...



USABLE PRIVACY IS MULTIDISCIPLINARY

- Computer Science
- UX
- Psychology
- Linguistics
- Law
- Social Sciences
- ...

CURRENT TOPICS: AI





CURRENT TRENDS: PLATFORM REGULATION

Article 25 Digital Services Act (DSA)
Online interface design and organisation

"Providers of online platforms shall not design, organize or operate their online interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates the recipients of their service or in a way that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of the recipients of their service to make free and informed decisions."





Santos et al., Which Online Platforms and Dark Patterns Should Be Regulated Under Article 25 of the DSA?, SSRN Preprint, July 2024, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4899559



WANT TO LEARN MORE?



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https://christineutz.net

I supervise **theses** and **research internships** in ...

Usable privacy

Online tracking

Defense mechanisms & strategies

Analyzing dark patterns and privacy risks in apps and online tools

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