#### Outline

- Why probabilistic logic?
- Abduction as an underlying framework
- Abduction by logic programming
- Relationship between graphical models and probabilistic logic
- Research topics

## **Why Relational + Probabilistic**

- Structure, but also uncertainty
- Medical diagnosis, pedigrees, etc.
- Social network structures, citation analysis, etc.





### Representations

We have see generalisations of propositional logic:

 $\textit{Talented} \land \textit{GoodTeacher} \rightarrow \textit{PassCourse}$ 


Extensions in different directions:

- 1. How to incorporate uncertainty?
  - Rule-based uncertainty (1970's and 1980's)

 $\textit{Talented} \land \textit{GoodTeacher} \xrightarrow{\textbf{CF}=0.9} \textit{PassCourse}$ 

- Bayesian networks (1990's now)
- 2. How to incorporate relations?
  - First-order logic as a general language

#### **Bayesian networks**



$$P(P, S, T) = P(P \mid S, T)P(S)P(T)$$

Allows computing arbitrary probabilities:

$$P(p \mid t, g) = 0.9$$
$$P(p \mid t) = \dots$$
$$P(t \mid p) = \dots$$

# **First-order logic**

First-order logic allows modelling relations; consider this formula  $\varphi$ :

 $\forall s \ \textit{Talented}(s) \land \textit{GoodTeacher} \rightarrow \textit{PassCourse}(s) \tag{1}$ 

Example reasoning (first-order, abductive):

If John does not pass the course, then (obviously) it is because of the teachers

 $\{\varphi, \forall s \text{Talented}(s), \neg PassCourse(J)\} \models \neg GoodTeacher$ 

This might be bad news for Mary, because now there is no hypothesis H such that:

 $\{\varphi, \forall s \, Talented(s), \neg PassCourse(J), H\} \models PassCourse(M)$ 

### **Probability and First-Order Domains**

- FOL can talk about constants and relations
- Propositional/BN only about fixed settings
- So, FOL really opens up new possibilities for representing, reasoning and learning, but...
- We have seen before (with CF) that naive combinations of logic and probability need to be approached with care
- A key general issue: what does it mean to say:
  - P(Some randomly chosen bird can fly)  $\geq 0.8$
  - P(Tweety can fly)  $\ge 0.8$  (Tweety is a particular bird)
- Halpern (1990): type-1 and type-2 probability

## **Probabilistic relational reasoning**

- First-order logic: good for relational reasoning in various ways about classes of objects
- Probabilistic graphical models such as Bayesian networks are good for reasoning with uncertainty
- $\Rightarrow$  Is there no way to combine them?

Solutions for:

- Probability that all students are talented
- Probability that Mary will pass the course, given the observations about John

## **Many combinations**

- Hot topic in AI, many approaches since end of the nineties
- Start from logic programming: KBMC, SLP, PRISM, LPAD, ICL, CPLogic, SCFG, etc.
- Start from probabilistic graphical models: BLP, BLN, SRM, RMM, MLN, RDN, etc.

Probabilistic programming languages starting to appear


- Imperative-Functional: infer.net, Church, Factorie, Scala, etc.
- Horn-Logic and Prolog: PRISM, ProbLog, ICL, Dyna, etc.

#### **Lessons learned**

Consider:

- if P(a) = 0.3 and P(b) = 0.6, what is  $P(a \land b)$ ?
- if P(a) = 0.3 and P(b) = 0.6, what is  $P(a \lor b)$ ?
- if  $P(h \mid e) = 0.3$  and  $P(h \mid e') = 0.3$ , what is  $P(h \mid e, e')$ ?


### **Probabilistic reasoning**



$$P(x_3) = \sum_{X_1, X_2} P(x_3 \mid X_1, X_2) P(X_1) P(X_2)$$

probabilistic reasoning = abduction?


### **Recall: abductive explanations**



- Causal specification:  $\Sigma = (\Delta, \Phi, \mathcal{R})$ , met:
  - $\Delta$ : potential causes and incompleteness assumptions (assumables)
  - $\Phi$ : facts that can be observed
  - $\mathcal{R}$ : causal model
- **Explanations (prediction)**  $E \subseteq \Delta$ :  $\mathcal{R} \cup E \vDash F$

Let 
$$\mathcal{E}(F)$$
 be the set of all explanations of  $F$ 

## **Example explanations**




Causal specification:  $\Sigma = (\Delta, \Phi, \mathcal{R})$ 

- **•** Example 1:  $\mathcal{R} \cup \{ \textit{flu}, \alpha_1 \} \vDash \textit{chills} \land \textit{thirst}$
- **•** Example 2:  $\mathcal{R} \cup \{ \textit{flu}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \} \models \textit{chills} \land \textit{thirst}$

The set of all explanations for chills and thirst contains:

$$\mathcal{E}(\text{chills} \land \text{thirst}) = \{\{\text{flu}, \alpha_1\}, \{\text{flu}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2\}, \\ \{\text{flu}, \alpha_1, \text{sport}\}, \{\text{flu}, \alpha_1, \text{sport}, \alpha_2\}\}$$

### **Closed world assumption**




**Closed world assumption:** *F* is only true if and only if one of its explanations is true:

$$F = \bigvee_{E_i \in \mathcal{E}(F)} E_i$$

e.g: chills  $\wedge$  thirst =  $(flu \wedge \alpha_1) \vee (flu \wedge \alpha_1 \wedge \alpha_2)$  $\vee (flu \wedge \alpha_1 \wedge sport) \vee (flu \wedge \alpha_1 \wedge sport \wedge \alpha_2)$ 

# **Idea for adding probabilities**



Suppose we have a probability distribution over  $\Delta$ , i.e.,  $P(\Delta)$ , then we can compute P(F), because:

$$P(F) = P(\bigvee_{E_i \in \mathcal{E}(F)} E_i)$$

 $P(\textit{chills} \land \textit{thirst}) = P((\textit{flu} \land \alpha_1) \lor (\textit{flu} \land \alpha_1 \land \alpha_2) \\ \lor (\textit{flu} \land \alpha_1 \land \textit{sport}) \lor (\textit{flu} \land \alpha_1 \land \textit{sport} \land \alpha_2))$ 

### **Sufficiency of minimal explanations**

**Definition.** A minimal explanation *E* for *F* is an explanation *E* for *F* s.t. there is no  $E' \subset E$  where E' is an explanation for *F*.

Theorem. Let  $\mathcal{E}_m(F)$  be the set of all minimal explanations for *F*. Then:


$$F = \bigvee_{E_i \in \mathcal{E}_m(F)} E_i$$

**Proof (sketch).** Note that if  $E_i \in \mathcal{E}_m(F)$  and  $E_j \supset E_i$ , then:

$$E_i \vee E_j = E_i$$

Proof by induction on the number of non-minimal explanations

#### **Minimal explanations: example**



chills 
$$\wedge$$
 thirst =  $(flu \wedge \alpha_1) \vee (flu \wedge \alpha_1 \wedge sport) \vee \cdots$   
=  $flu \wedge \alpha_1$ 

Recall that this is the solution formula S for F: the most specific formula consisting only of abducible literals, such that

$$\mathsf{COMP}[\mathcal{R}; N] \cup F \models S$$

# **Defining a probability distribution**


- We assume a very simple distribution consisting of a set of independent random variables
- Partition  $V \subseteq \Delta$  is associated to a random variable  $X_V$  where V is the domain of X

```
Example:

P(X = sport) = 0.3 (Assumption of the equation of
```

(Assumption: sport and flu are mutually exclusive)

## Example



$$P(\textbf{myalgia}) = P((\textbf{flu} \land \alpha_2) \lor \textbf{sport})$$
  
=  $P(\textbf{flu} \land \alpha_2) + P(\textbf{sport})$   
=  $P(\textbf{flu})P(\alpha_2) + P(\textbf{sport})$   
=  $0.1 \cdot 0.7 + 0.3 = 0.37$ 

Problem: how to obtain the minimal explanations?

# **Recall: logic programming**

- A substitution  $\theta$  is a finite set of the form  $\theta = \{t_1/x_1, \dots, t_n/x_n\}$ , with  $x_i$  a variable and  $t_i$  a term;  $x_i \neq t_i$  and  $x_i \neq x_j$ ,  $i \neq j$
- A grounded expression does not contain variables
- A substitution  $\theta$  is called a unifier of E and E' if  $E\theta = E'\theta$ ; E and E' are then called unifiable
- SLD resolution (for Horn clauses):

$$\leftarrow (B_1, \dots, B_n)\theta, \qquad (B_i \leftarrow A_1, \dots, A_m)\theta \\ \leftarrow (B_1, \dots, B_{i-1}, A_1, \dots, A_m, B_{i+1}, \dots, B_n)\theta$$

such that  $B_i$  unifies given substitution  $\theta$ 


SLD derivation = backward reasoning + unification

## **Explanations: by resolution**

Given the following specification:

$chills \leftarrow fever$	<b>sport</b> : 0.3, <b>flu</b> : 0.1
$thirst \leftarrow fever$	$lpha_1: 0.9$
fever $\leftarrow$ flu	$lpha_2:0.7$
myalgia $\leftarrow$ flu	
myalgia $\leftarrow$ sport	

Suppose F = myalgia:




## **Explanations: by resolution**

Given the following specification:

$chills \leftarrow fever$	<i>sport</i> : 0.3, <i>flu</i> : 0.1
$thirst \leftarrow fever$	$lpha_1: 0.9$
fever $\leftarrow$ flu	$lpha_2:0.7$
myalgia $\leftarrow$ flu	
myalgia $\leftarrow$ sport	

Suppose F = myalgia:



# The AILog system

```
prob flu : 0.1, sport : 0.3, dummy : 0.6.
prob a1 : 0.9.
prob a2 : 0.7.
```

```
chills <- fever & al.
fever <- flu.
thirst <- fever.
myalgia <- flu & a2.
myalgia <- sport.</pre>
```

gives:

```
ailog: predict myalgia.
Answer: P(myalgia|Obs)=0.37.
[ok,more,explanations,worlds,help]: explanations.
0: ass([],[a2,flu],0.06999999999999999)
1: ass([],[sport],0.3)
```

### **The first-order case**

- Explanations are sets of ground assumables
- In particular: ground assumables used in an SLD proof
- A declaration:

 $a_1: p, a_2: p_2, \ldots, a_n: p_n$ 

now defines a random variable  $X_i$  for every grounding of  $a_1, \ldots, a_n$  such that  $P(X_i = a_j \theta_i) = p_j$ 

Example:

Flu(p): 0.1, Sport(p): 0.3, Other(p): 0.6

implies e.g. Flu(Arjen) = 0.1

### **First-order inference: example**

Given is:

 $PassCourse(s) \leftarrow \alpha(s), GoodTeacher$ GoodTeacher: 0.7 $\alpha(s): 0.9$ 

What is P(PassCourse(M))?

 $\begin{array}{ll} \leftarrow \textit{PassCourse}(M) & \textit{PassCourse}(s) \leftarrow \alpha(s), \textit{GoodTeacher} \\ & \leftarrow \alpha(M), \textit{GoodTeacher} & \alpha(s): 0.9 \\ & \leftarrow \textit{GoodTeacher} & \textit{GoodTeacher}: 0.7 \end{array}$ 

 $P(PassCourse(M)) = P(\alpha(M) \land GoodTeacher) = 0.63$ 

### **Conditional probabilities**

By the definition of conditional probability:

$$P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(A \land B)}{P(B)} = \frac{P(\bigvee_{E_i \in \mathcal{E}_m(A \land B)} E_i)}{P(\bigvee_{E_i \in \mathcal{E}_m(B)} E_i)}$$

Example:

 $\mathcal{E}_{m}(\textit{PassCourse}(J)) = \{\{\textit{GoodTeacher}, \alpha(J)\}\}\$  $\mathcal{E}_{m}(\textit{PassCourse}(M) \land \textit{PassCourse}(J))$  $= \{\{\textit{GoodTeacher}, \alpha(J), \alpha(M)\}\}\$ 

 $P(\mathbf{PC}(M) \mid \mathbf{PC}(J)) = \frac{P(\mathbf{GoodTeacher}) \cdot P(\alpha(J)) \cdot P(\alpha(M))}{P(\mathbf{GoodTeacher}) \cdot P(\alpha(J))}$  $= P(\alpha(M)) = 0.9$ 

### Expressiveness

- Every Bayesian network can be translated to probabilistic logic (Assignment 2)
  - Intuition: each variable given its parent in the graph becomes an implication
- Every ground probabilistic program can be converted into a Bayesian network
  - What happens to multiple rules with the same head?
- Every non-ground probabilistic program can be seen as a template for a Bayesian network:

$$A(x) \leftarrow \alpha(x), B(x)$$


can be seen as a piece of Bayesian network for every instantiation for x

#### **Recall: causal independence**

$$P(e \mid C_{1}, \dots, C_{n}) = \sum_{I_{1}, \dots, I_{n}} P(e \mid I_{1}, \dots, I_{n}) \prod_{k=1}^{n} P(I_{k} \mid C_{k})$$
$$= \sum_{b(I_{1}, \dots, I_{n}) = e} \prod_{k=1}^{n} P(I_{k} \mid C_{k})$$

Boolean functions:  $P(E | I_1, ..., I_n) \in \{0, 1\}$  with  $\underline{b}(I_1, ..., I_n) = 1$  if  $P(e | I_1, ..., I_n) = 1$ 

## **Noisy-OR model**



Example: suppose we have an OR model and two (true) causes, it follows:

$$P(e \mid c_1, c_2) = P(i_1 \mid c_1)P(\neg i_2 \mid c_2) + P(i_1 \mid c_1)P(\neg i_2 \mid c_2) + P(i_1 \mid c_1)P(i_2 \mid c_2)$$


Compare:  $\mathcal{R} = \{E(x) \leftarrow \alpha(x, k, y), C(k, y)\}$  with  $\alpha(x, k, y)$ and C(k, y) assumables

# Noisy-OR model (2)

 $P(E(t) \mid C_1(t), C_2(t))$ 

- $= \frac{P(\mathcal{E}(E(t), C_1(t), C_2(t)))}{P(\mathcal{E}(C_1(t), C_2(t)))}$
- $= \frac{P((\alpha(t,1,t)\wedge C_1(t)\wedge C_2(t))\vee(\alpha(t,2,t)\wedge C_1(t)\wedge C_2(t)))}{P(C_1(t)\wedge C_2(t))}$
- $= \frac{P(C_1(t) \wedge C_2(t) \wedge (\alpha(t,1,t) \vee \alpha(t,2,t)))}{P(C_1(t) \wedge C_2(t))}$
- $= P(\alpha(t,1,t) \lor \alpha(t,2,t))$
- $= P(\alpha(t,1,t) \land \alpha(t,2,t)) + P(\alpha(t,1,t) \land \alpha(f,2,t)) + P(\alpha(f,1,t) \land \alpha(t,2,t))$
- $= P(\alpha(t, 1, t))P(\alpha(t, 2, t)) + P(\alpha(t, 1, t))P(\alpha(f, 2, t)) + P(\alpha(f, 1, t))P(\alpha(t, 2, t))$

### **Goal: Probabilistic Logic Learning**




## **Example: Markov Logic Networks**

- Specify undirected models (Markov networks) with the use of first-order logic
- An interface layer for AI (Domingos)
- Syntax: weighted first-order formulas
- Semantics: feature templates for Markov networks
- Intuition: soften logical constraints
  - Each formula has a weight
  - Higher weights mean stronger constraints
  - P(world) exp(sum weights of formulas it satisfies)

# **Example: Markov Logic Networks(2)**

- 1.5  $\forall x \text{ MentionOf}(x, \text{Obama}) \Rightarrow \text{Head}(x, \text{"Obama"})$
- 0.8  $\forall x \text{ MentionOf}(x, \text{Obama}) \Rightarrow \text{Head}(x, \text{"President"})$
- 100  $\forall x, y, c \text{ Apposition}(x, y) \land \text{ MentionOf}(x, c) \Rightarrow \text{ MentionOf}(y, c)$

Two mention constants: A and B



# **Example: ProbLog**

- Probabilistic Prolog (Problog) at KU Leuven
- Probabilistic programming language (extends YAP Prolog, as opposed to meta-interpreter such as AILog)
- Supports probabilistic inference/learning in Prolog
- Fast and Free at http://dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/problog/
- Standard clauses:  $path(X, Y, A) : -X \neq Y, edge(X, Y), etc.$
- Probabilistic facts: 0.9 :: edge(y, 1, 2)
- Syntactic sugar: 0.3 ::  $fall(X) \lor 0.7 :: stay(X) \leftarrow manipulate(X)$
- Basically extends standard Prolog queries like ? q(X). and ? - mother(a, Y) to ? - prob(q(X)). and ? - prob(mother(a, Y))

## **Research topics**

Efficient inference: given the explanations, it is not so easy to compute the probability, e.g., consider this:

 $P(a \lor b \lor c) = P(a) + P(a \land \neg b) + P(a \land \neg b \land \neg c)$ 

Semantical questions such as dealing with hard constraints. Recall that in abduction we have nogoods,

false <- chills

What does this mean for the probability distribution? And would it possible to add soft constraints?

- Learning clauses and parameters from data
- Application oriented: many application fields are both relational as well as probabilistic