



# Plan your defense: A comparative analysis of leakage detection methods on RISC-V cores

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
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- ▶ Microprocessors are vital in modern digital systems.
  - From consumer electronics to critical infrastructure.
- ▶ Their security is crucial to protect against various forms of attacks.
  - We focus on side-channel attacks.
- ▶ First step to enhance the security of RISC-V cores.
  - Assess the leakage:
    - ▶ Side-channel Vulnerability Factor (SVF)
    - ▶ Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
- ▶ Our contribution:
  - A comparative analysis of SVF and TVLA
    - ▶ on SHAKTI and Ibex RISC-V cores running AES and SHA-3.



Most common side channel resources:

Power



Timing




EM emissions



# Simulation versus Real measurements


## ► Simulation

- pre-silicon analysis
- reduced cost, very time demanding




## ► Measurements

- post-silicon analysis
- dedicate equipment, real behavior



- ▶ Pre-silicon and simulation:
  - A V Lakshmy, Chester Rebeiro, and Swarup Bhunia. **“FORTIFY: Analytical Pre-Silicon Side-Channel Characterization of Digital Designs”**. In: *ASP-DAC*. 2022, pp. 660–665. DOI: [10.1109/ASP-DAC52403.2022.9712551](https://doi.org/10.1109/ASP-DAC52403.2022.9712551)
- ▶ Side channel metrics based on measurements:
  - Kostas Papagiannopoulos et al. **“The Side-channel Metrics Cheat Sheet”**. In: *ACM Comput. Surv.* 55.10 (2023). DOI: [10.1145/3565571](https://doi.org/10.1145/3565571)
- ▶ Hybrid approach use information from pre-silicon to model better the post- assessment:
  - Dillibabu Shanmugam and Patrick Schaumont. **“Improving Side-channel Leakage Assessment Using Pre-silicon Leakage Models”**. In: *Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design*. Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023, pp. 105–124. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-031-29497-6\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29497-6_6)

# Framework



## TVLA computation

- ▶ Fixed versus random test
- ▶ Simulated executions
- ▶ Hypothetical power consumption model:
  - Hamming Weight (HW)
- ▶ Calculation of traces:
  - HW for every timestamp
- ▶ Size of random set:
  - $N = 128$  for SHAKTI
  - $N = 256$  for Ibex


The  $t$ -test statistic is computed as follows:

$$\frac{\mu_A - \mu_B}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_A^2}{N_A} + \frac{\sigma_B^2}{N_B}}}$$

where:

- ▶  $\mu$  the average of the traces,
- ▶  $\sigma$  the standard deviation, and
- ▶  $N$  the number of traces.

# SVF similarity phase



Similarity matrix  $M_{\text{input}}^{\mathcal{O}}$  for the Oracle:


$$M_{\text{input}}^{\mathcal{O}}(o_t^i, o_t^j) = \begin{cases} \tilde{D}(o_t^i; o_t^j), & \text{if } i < j \\ 0, & \text{if not.} \end{cases}$$

and similarity matrix  $M_{\text{input}}^S$  for every simulated trace:

$$M_{\text{input}}^S(s_t^i, s_t^j) = \begin{cases} \bar{D}(s_t^i, s_t^j), & \text{if } i < j \\ 0, & \text{if not.} \end{cases}$$

where  $\bar{D}$  is the Hamming distance and zeros are omitted.

## SVF correlation phase



For every pair of traces Oracle and Side-channel, the Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated in absolute terms:

$$SVF_t = |\rho(\tilde{D}_o, \tilde{D}_{s,t})|$$

and if we want SVF for the module:

$$SVF_{\text{module}} = \max(SVF)$$

Four classes of leakage:


- 0.0 - 0.1: No leakage.
- 0.1 - 0.3: Mild leakage.
- 0.3 - 0.6: Medium leakage.
- 0.6 - 1.0: Severe leakage.

## SHA3(Keccak-f) intermediate values


- ▶ For SHA-3 we target the operations:

- In the non-linear  $\chi$  step:
  - ▶ *xor* operation
  - ▶ *not* operation
- and *bc*, implementation-specific operation
  - ▶  $bc[i] = st[j + i]$ , where  $i = 0$  and  $j = 0$ .

- ▶ step  $\chi$



## AES intermediate values





► For AES we target:

- the first byte of the S-box output,
- the full round output,
- the first byte of the round output.



► AES byte ordering

0	4	8	12
1	5	9	13
2	6	10	14
3	7	11	15



## Results AES/ALU/Shakti





## Results AES/ALU/Ibex



## Results SHA3/ALU/Shakti



## Results SHA3/ALU/Ibex



Thank you!

